

NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2015



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ON THE COVER

Protesters and riot police, Kyiv, Ukraine, January 2014. *Photograph by Sasha Maksymenko*

Nations in Transit 2015:

Democracy on the Defensive in Europe and Eurasia

by Sylvana Habdank-Kořaczkowska

As the war in Ukraine makes clear, democratization in postcommunist Europe and Eurasia is not simply slow or stalled. It is actively opposed by forces that are determined to see it fail.

Findings of the 2015 edition of *Nations in Transit* (NIT), Freedom House's annual study of democratic governance in 29 countries from Central Europe to Central Asia, underscore the growing audacity of democracy's foes in Eurasia, where 4 in 5 people live under authoritarian rule.

When the first edition of NIT was published 20 years ago, only three countries—Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—were considered “consolidated authoritarian regimes.” Since 2000, however, the number of such regimes has more than doubled, and Eurasia's average democracy score has fallen from 5.4 to 6.03 on a 7-point scale. Over the last 10 years in particular, authoritarian leaders who paid lip service to democratic reform have systematized their repressive tactics and largely abandoned any pretense of inclusive politics.

In 2014, Russia earned its largest ratings decline in a decade, reflecting the fact that Moscow's aggression abroad is closely tied to the Putin regime's domestic struggle for survival. As it sought to destabilize the new democratic government in Ukraine, the Kremlin stepped up its suppression of dissent at home, targeting online media, opposition figures, and civil society groups with legal bans on “extremism,” trumped-up criminal charges, and other restrictions.

In Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev's regime brought a new intensity to its multiyear crackdown on activists and journalists who threatened to expose official corruption and other abuses. Many were jailed during the

year on fabricated charges like hooliganism or possession of weapons and drugs. Even as it shut down U.S.-funded media and democracy organizations, Azerbaijan chaired the executive body of the Council of Europe from May to November, and it is currently hosting the 2015 European Games. The country's NIT score has fallen nearly every year for the past decade, leaving it with a ranking worse than Russia, Tajikistan, or Belarus in *Nations in Transit 2015*.

Democracy's most brazen opponents are far less powerful in Central and Southeastern Europe, yet there are cases in which parties and personalities that openly flout democratic norms have risen to the top. Media freedom, national democratic governance, and the fairness of the electoral process in Hungary have declined more rapidly in the five years since Viktor Orbán and his right-leaning Fidesz party came to power than in any other NIT country during the same period. Only Russia's judicial independence rating has seen as much deterioration as Hungary's over the last five years.

While Orbán stands out in the region for the virtual political monopoly he has achieved, he is not alone in his disdain for democratic standards. The European Union and its aspiring member states have no shortage of individuals and groups that, through the exercise of political and economic pressure, or by exploiting public anxieties and prejudices, contrive to keep or obtain power at the expense of democratic values and institutions in their countries.

NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2015: OVERVIEW OF RATINGS CHANGES

Democracy Scores declined in 12 of the 29 countries surveyed in NIT 2015, and improved in 4 countries.

▼ Decline ▲ Improvement □ Unchanged

	COUNTRY	DS 2015 (DS 2014)	EP	CS	IM	NDG	LDG	JFI	CO
BALKANS	Albania	4.14 (4.18)				▲			
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	4.46 (4.43)						▼	
	Croatia	3.68							
	Kosovo	5.14			▲			▼	
	Macedonia	4.07 (4.00)	▼	▼					
	Montenegro	3.89 (3.86)			▼				
	Serbia	3.68 (3.64)			▼				
CENTRAL EUROPE	Bulgaria	3.29 (3.25)						▼	
	Czech Republic	2.21 (2.25)				▲			
	Estonia	1.96							
	Hungary	3.18 (2.96)	▼	▼	▼		▼	▼	
	Latvia	2.07							
	Lithuania	2.36							
	Poland	2.21 (2.18)	▼						
	Romania	3.46	▼						▲
	Slovakia	2.64 (2.61)			▼				
Slovenia	1.93								
EURASIA	Armenia	5.36							
	Azerbaijan	6.75 (6.68)		▼				▼	
	Belarus	6.71							
	Georgia	4.64 (4.68)					▲		
	Kazakhstan	6.61							
	Kyrgyzstan	5.93 (5.89)		▼					
	Moldova	4.86							
	Russia	6.46 (6.29)		▼	▼	▼	▼	▼	
	Tajikistan	6.39 (6.32)		▼				▼	
	Turkmenistan	6.93							
	Ukraine	4.75 (4.93)	▲	▲	▲				▲
	Uzbekistan	6.93							

Categories: EP – Electoral Process, CS – Civil Society, IM – Independent Media, NDG – National Democratic Governance, LDG – Local Democratic Governance, JFI – Judicial Framework and Independence, CO – Corruption, DS – Democracy Score.

The NIT ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The NIT 2015 ratings reflect the period from 1 January through 31 December 2014.

Perhaps the most alarming fact about these trends in Eurasia and Europe is that they are not unrelated. Menaced by nearby Russian military activity and aggressive propaganda aimed at their Russian-speaking national minorities, countries on the EU’s eastern fringes risk overreacting in ways that threaten free speech and other civil liberties. Across Europe, Russian money and inspiration emboldens xenophobic and illiberal political movements that could break European unity on critical human rights and foreign policy matters. Wealthy Eurasian autocracies more

broadly—through their energy firms, lobbyists, investments, and offshore accounts—have a corrupting influence on European politicians and businessmen, who help to dampen criticism of such regimes’ abuses, forestall any punitive action, and weaken institutional safeguards in their own countries.

Information war

Throughout 2014, propaganda masquerading as news and disseminated through Russia’s state-controlled media worked to simultaneously obscure and legitimize

the Kremlin's aggression abroad. Nearby countries that felt threatened by this offensive, particularly those with sizeable Russian-speaking minorities, reacted in a variety of ways, some of which amounted to censorship.

Ukrainian authorities, facing both a military invasion and a deluge of misinformation from Moscow, suspended the retransmission of at least 15 Russian television channels in 2014. Moldova, whose break-away territory of Transnistria is supported by Moscow, also imposed suspensions and fines on some stations for carrying Russian propaganda.

Even Latvia and Lithuania, which despite some recent declines receive among the highest ratings for media independence in *Nations in Transit*, struggled to come up with appropriate responses to Russian propaganda. **Latvia** banned the rebroadcasting of Rossiya RTR for biased reporting and incitement to hatred, emphasizing the danger of programming that “splits society” over the situation in Ukraine and on “issues concerning Latvia’s foreign and domestic policy situation.”


Lithuania’s media watchdog suspended rebroadcasts of Russia’s Channel One and the Gazprom-owned NTV Mir for three months each, after they aired a Kremlin-friendly cinematic interpretation of the Soviet army’s failed attempt to remove Lithuania’s pro-independence government in 1991. Lithuania also temporarily blocked broadcasts by the Russian channels RTR Planeta and REN TV Baltic for inciting hatred over and against Ukraine. In December, President Dalia Grybauskaitė proposed legislation that would increase fines on broadcasters that spread war propaganda, and allow the radio and television commission to refuse licenses to broadcasters that have committed “crimes against Lithuania or have links with certain organizations that may threaten national security.”

Estonia, which ranks just below **Slovenia** as the most democratic country in the survey, was more circumspect in its reaction, advancing plans for its own Russian-language television station with programming governed by journalistic principles of accuracy and objectivity.

Ukraine in transit

The event that raised alarm in Moscow and triggered its military intervention—the February 2014 collapse of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich’s authoritarian government—was a clear boon for democracy in Ukraine. Massive street protests calling for European integration hardened into a determined movement against corrupt elites after authorities attempted to

INDEPENDENT MEDIA SCORES, NIT 2015




disperse the demonstrations with gunfire, and support for Yanukovich in the parliament quickly evaporated. His flight from the country paved the way for fair and competitive elections that featured considerable turnover in the political class.

The protest movement, known as Euromaidan, also generated a surge of civil society activism that continued throughout the year, with citizen groups collaborating in drafting government reforms and providing aid to those affected by the conflict in the east. In another positive trend, state pressure on media outlets eased markedly during 2014.

For all of these breakthroughs, the stability and

UKRAINE'S DEMOCRACY SCORE, NIT 2004–2015

On the eve of the Euromaidan movement, Ukraine's performance on Freedom House indicators was nearly identical to the pre-Orange Revolution period.



The NIT ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The NIT 2015 ratings reflect the period from 1 January through 31 December 2014.

security of Ukraine's new government and institutions remained fragile. Many crucial reforms had yet to be enacted at year's end, and Kyiv's control over its territory was battered by Russia's occupation of Crimea and infusions of military personnel and equipment into the Donbas region. The Russian-instigated separatist conflict in the Donbas has devastated the area, cost thousands of lives, and hampered Ukraine's efforts to revive its already weakened economy.

In a year of such disturbing developments, Russia earned its largest single-year decline in a decade. It now has a worse democracy score than Tajikistan.

Reactionary Russia

The example set by the Euromaidan movement in Ukraine posed a serious challenge to the Kremlin, which had been working to crush dissent since Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency in 2012 was greeted with opposition protests. However, the regime's efforts to sabotage the new Ukrainian government by force of arms created new domestic problems, as international sanctions weakened the economy and

activists raised objections to the unacknowledged Russian military presence in the Donbas.

Throughout 2014, the Russian government used new and existing laws to harass civil society, branding human rights activists and other critics as "foreign agents" and "extremists." With flagrant propaganda dominating state-controlled television, authorities also put legal and regulatory pressure on the country's few independent news outlets, like Dozhd TV and *Vedomosti*, as well as on numerous online media platforms. Regional elections in September were carefully managed from above, with any genuine opposition eliminated, and LGBT people continued to be scapegoated as moral degenerates who would run amok if the West had its way.

In a year of such disturbing developments, Russia earned its largest single-year decline in a decade. It now has a worse democracy score than Tajikistan.

Weak institutions in Eurasian states seeking EU ties

Despite Russian threats and attempts to derail the process, both Moldova and Georgia joined Ukraine in signing Association Agreements and related free-trade pacts with the EU in June 2014, and they remain, with Ukraine, the best NIT performers in Eurasia. Yet **Moldova's** progress toward EU standards on a number of indicators has been dispiritingly slow. The November parliamentary elections, though genuinely competitive and generally well administered, were marred by some significant deficiencies, including the abrupt disqualification of the pro-Russian Patria Party just days before the voting.

Apart from Ukraine, **Georgia** is the only country in Eurasia to have earned a recent improvement in the electoral process rating. Free and more competitive elections in 2012 and 2013 led to increased pluralism at the national level, and in 2014 Georgian cities held direct mayoral elections for the first time, with five major parties actively campaigning for seats. Still, the ruling Georgian Dream bloc won every directly elected mayoral seat and majority control over every legislature.

Armenia was offered an EU Association Agreement in 2013, but it moved to join the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union instead. While all three of these countries are subject to Russian pressure due to crippling territorial disputes that Moscow has encouraged and sustained, Armenia is the most dependent on Russia due to its closed border with Turkey, the military threat from Azerbaijan, and Russian ownership of key energy

and electricity infrastructure. Notwithstanding its rapid growth in internet penetration, the prosecution of some officials on corruption charges, and signs of improvement in the administration of elections, Armenia's overall democracy score has not budged in three years and is still somewhat worse than 10 years ago.

Indeed, in addition to their territorial problems, all three countries continue to suffer from weak, politicized judicial systems that often fail to maintain the rule of law or hold political and business elites accountable for abuses. Even when ostensibly reformist, pro-European politicians win elections in such settings, the credibility of their platforms and of the democratic model in general is damaged by unchecked graft and opacity.

Dictatorship prevails elsewhere in Eurasia

The Aliyev regime's intensified crackdown on dissent in 2014 pushed **Azerbaijan's** democracy score to 6.75, near the bottom of the 7-point scale and even lower than that of **Belarus**, once described as "Europe's last dictatorship." Both countries released a number of political prisoners late in the year, but in neither case were these actions accompanied by any shift in policy or greater tolerance for independent political activity. At year's end, it was estimated that Azerbaijan still held at least 90 political prisoners.


As with Azerbaijan, **Kazakhstan's** wealth and strategic cooperation have discouraged many European and other democracies from demanding accountability for its poor human rights record. In 2014, the authorities shut down protests and arrested demonstrators, closed independent media outlets, and fined and jailed religious leaders. New criminal and administrative codes created further restrictions on the use of social media and freedom of assembly.

Democracy indicators for **Tajikistan** declined for the fourth consecutive year in 2014 as the government continued its sustained offensive against perceived threats, from opposition activists and their lawyers to academic researchers. The use of a pliant judiciary to mete out such harassment has reached critical levels, as have harsh conditions in Tajikistan's prisons. At year's end, the parliament was considering a version of the Russian law requiring certain nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to register as "foreign agents," carbon copies of which have sprung up across the region since Moscow adopted it in 2012.

Uzbekistan and **Turkmenistan** continued to earn

EURASIA'S DEMOCRACY SCORES, NIT 2001–2015

Russia has been the main driver of the decline in the regional average over the past 15 years.



the report's worst possible rating of 7 on nearly every indicator. New legislation adopted in Uzbekistan in 2014 formalized the already widespread practice of persecuting people with prior convictions through a variety of "preventative" restrictions, enforced by police and the country's ubiquitous neighborhood committees.


Kyrgyzstan is still the best-performing country in Central Asia, and unlike its neighbors it is not currently classified as a consolidated authoritarian regime. However, it lost ground on the civil society indicator in 2014 as the government increased restrictions on freedom of assembly and NGOs that had pushed back against illiberal legislative proposals the previous year.



Ukrainian soldiers near Slovyansk, Ukraine, July 2014. Photograph by Sasha Maksymenko

NUMBER OF COUNTRIES BY REGIME TYPE

Over the last decade, the number of consolidated authoritarian regimes almost doubled as repressive governments abandoned any pretense of political pluralism.



Stagnation and backsliding in the Balkans

Most countries in the Balkans continue to make only fitful progress on *Nations in Transit's* democratization indicators, and there are still no consolidated democratic regimes in the region. In fact, three countries—Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro—have worse democracy scores now than they did five years ago.

New EU member **Croatia's** democratic institutions are still considered “semiconsolidated” according to the NIT methodology, which takes into account the country's overwhelmed court system, its struggles with high-level corruption, and the pressure and intimidation frequently faced by its journalists.

In **Albania**, the government that took office in 2013 has initiated some welcome reforms and taken prelim-

inary steps to combat corruption. However, the court system has yet to establish a track record of high-level prosecutions. The weakness of investigative journalism is compounded by pervasive organized crime. After three rejections, Albania officially became an EU candidate country in June 2014.

Serbia, which is currently moving toward EU accession, registered a decline in its independent media rating for 2014. As flooding devastated parts of the country in May, the government declared a state of emergency and blocked media criticism of its response to the disaster. Cyberattacks, threats against journalists, and economic pressure led to increased self-censorship and a decrease in investigative reporting throughout the year. Three prominent news programs were canceled in 2014 amid allegations of political interference.

Threats to media independence and a decline in journalistic standards have become more pronounced throughout the region. In neighboring **Montenegro**, a popular tabloid launched a smear campaign against MANS, a prominent NGO, and several activists. In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, strong ties between publishers, reporters, and politicians have nearly eradicated truly independent journalism.

Kosovo has recently benefited from an increase in independent news outlets and investigative journalism online, but media in the country continue to suffer from problems common to most of its neighbors, particularly progovernment bias at public broadcasters, self-censorship caused by editorial pressure from political leaders and private owners, and harassment or attacks on journalists that usually go unpunished.

In **Macedonia**, presidential and early parliamentary elections in April 2014 were marred by progovernment media bias and abuse of administrative resources, leading to another long-term parliamentary boycott by opposition deputies. The government continues to pursue a number of positive EU-mandated institutional reforms, but worrying developments in the last few years have called into question the ruling party's commitment to political pluralism and transparency. Throughout 2014, civil society groups and spontaneous popular movements pushed back unsuccessfully against problematic government-backed proposals, including legislation undermining the independence of universities.


Unmet expectations in Central Europe

Nearly all the EU member states of Central and South-eastern Europe have consolidated their democratic

AVERAGE SCORES FOR EU ACCESSION AND APPLICANT COUNTRIES

The average ratings of the NIT countries just entering or hoping to enter the EU have grown worse with each round of accession.

- 2004 ENTRANTS
- 2007 ENTRANTS
- 2013 ENTRANT
- 2014 CANDIDATES/POTENTIAL CANDIDATES



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institutions and created strong protections for civil society organizations and the media in the quarter-century since the fall of communism. Nevertheless, the average *Nations in Transit* democracy score of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 has declined by 0.25 points over the last decade. With Russia working actively to destabilize and demoralize democracies in the region, factors including the role of money in Central European politics, the pliability of judicial institutions, and economically weakening media sectors all raise concerns about the durability of these countries' gains.

The average *Nations in Transit* democracy score of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 has declined by 0.25 points over the last decade.

The only country in the group to register a net improvement in 2014 was the **Czech Republic**, where a new government restored some stability to politics despite friction within the ruling coalition and widespread concern over increasing partisan influence in the media. **Romania**, meanwhile, escalated its prosecution of high-level corruption cases, resulting in its first ratings improvement in that category since 2007. Unfortunately, media bias and polling problems for citizens living abroad during the presidential election led to a decline in Romania's electoral process rating. Although **Slovakia** received a negative ratings change due to increasing concentration of media ownership, the replacement of notoriously autocratic and litigious Supreme Court chairman Štefan Harabin was a positive development that may lead to improved transparency of the judiciary in the years to come.

Bulgaria's judiciary has benefited from reforms implemented in connection with EU accession, but the court system's failure to curb organized crime through convictions and asset seizures remains a serious problem, as do nontransparent and uncompetitive appointment procedures in the country's highest judicial bodies. In 2014

the politicized Supreme Judicial Council proved unable to elect a new chair for the Supreme Court of Cassation, leaving the post vacant for three months. In May, a member of the Sofia city prosecutor's office launched a probe into President Rosen Plevneliev's dealings with an international energy and environmental services company. The parliamentary investigation that accompanied the judicial probe was spearheaded by the far-right party Ataka and supported by the then ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party, of which Plevneliev had been critical.

In **Poland**, the legitimacy of apparently free and fair local elections was undermined by a high percentage of spoiled ballots and the National Electoral Commission's mishandling of a technical malfunction during tabulation.

Hungary's 'illiberal state'

In **Hungary**, elections in 2014 confirmed and strengthened the dominance of Viktor Orbán's Fidesz-led coalition. Throughout the parliamentary campaign, opposition parties criticized alleged gerrymandering in the ruling party's favor and the government's heavy influence over state television and radio, among other problems. Most of these grievances were echoed by international transparency monitors and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which also pointed to strong government influence over private media and the advertising market, and grossly unequal financial resources among the competing parties. A team of anticorruption watchdogs accused Fidesz and its junior coalition partner of spending more than twice the legal limit on their campaigns.

The resulting decline in Hungary's electoral process rating pushed the country into the "semiconsolidated democracy" category, where it joined Bulgaria, Romania, and three of the Western Balkan states. A new advertising tax on media, a rise in political interference with and harassment of NGOs, and several controversial Constitutional Court rulings contributed to a total of five ratings downgrades for Hungary in 2014, a distinction shared only by Russia. In July, Orbán explained in a speech that he was building an "illiberal state" that "does not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism such as freedom," but that also "does not make this ideology a central element of state organization."

Conclusion: Fighting to win

Russia's military aggression in Ukraine should dispel any lingering illusions that the Putin regime is a strategic partner of the EU and shares, even if it does not always pursue, broadly democratic goals and a commitment to the stability and security of the region. This regime is not an eccentric or demanding ally; it is an enemy of peace and human dignity and an evangelist for a system of government that degrades and disregards fundamental human rights, even when not at war.

Many of Russia's authoritarian neighbors are equally hostile to democracy and human rights, but as they grow wary of Moscow's unpredictable and even imperialistic behavior, there may be opportunities to extract concessions that put them on a path to reform. When governments in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, or Belarus look to Europe or the United States as a source of balance in this new geopolitical reality, Brussels and Washington should not miss the chance to set conditions such as the release of political prisoners and the easing of restrictions on opposition parties and the media.

Above all, it is imperative that the EU and its allies provide as much support as possible to the development of a strong democracy in Ukraine. Eurasia's entrenched authoritarian regimes

tirelessly warn their people that political change on the scale of the Euromaidan movement can only end in chaos, violence, and poverty. A Ukraine that is able to prosper economically while developing institutions and practices based on transparency and accountability would do more to shape attitudes in the region than any doomsday scenario presented on Russian television.

Given the nature of the external threat, Brussels and each EU member state will also need to do a better job of upholding democratic standards inside Europe. The EU has recently shown some determination on issues like energy policy and Ukraine-related sanctions. But to maintain its strength and unity, the bloc must insist on transparency in business and politics, ensure free and fair elections, and vigorously defend media freedom within its borders. This means creating mechanisms for monitoring, support, and enforcement through penalties, if necessary.

The past year and indeed the past 10 years have shown that democratization is often an adversarial process, and its proponents—whether dissidents, journalists, diplomats, or political leaders—cannot win if they are unwilling to fight.

Methodology

Nations in Transit 2015 measures progress and setbacks for democratization in 29 countries from Central Europe to Central Asia. The 20th edition of this annual study covers events from January 1 through December 31, 2014.

In consultation with country report authors, a panel of academic advisers, and a group of regional expert reviewers, Freedom House provides numerical ratings for each country on seven indicators:

- **National Democratic Governance.** Considers the democratic character and stability of the governmental system; the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of legislative and executive branches; and the democratic oversight of military and security services.
- **Electoral Process.** Examines national executive and legislative elections, electoral processes, the development of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process.
- **Civil Society.** Assesses the growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their organizational capacity and financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function; the development of free trade unions; and interest group participation in the policy process.
- **Independent Media.** Addresses the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the emergence of a financially viable

private press; and internet access for private citizens.

- **Local Democratic Governance.** Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities.
- **Judicial Framework and Independence.** Highlights constitutional reform, human rights protections, criminal code reform, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions.
- **Corruption.** Focuses on public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policy-makers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption mechanisms.

The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic progress. Minor to moderate developments typically warrant a positive or negative change of a quarter point (0.25), while significant developments warrant a half point (0.50). It is rare for any category to fluctuate more than a half point in a single year.

A country's **Democracy Score** is the average of its ratings on all seven indicators covered by *Nations in Transit*. Based on the Democracy Score, which is also on a scale of 1 to 7, Freedom House assigns each country to one of the following regime types:

Consolidated Democracies: Countries receiving a Democracy Score of 1.00–1.99 embody the best policies and practices of liberal democracy. Countries receiving a Democracy Score of 2.00–2.99 perform equally well on many indicators, but face challenges—often associated with corruption—that contribute to a slightly lower score.

Semi-Consolidated Democracies: Countries receiving a Democracy Score of 3.00–3.99 are electoral democracies that meet relatively high standards for the selection of national leaders

but exhibit some weaknesses in their defense of political rights and civil liberties.

Transitional or Hybrid Regimes: Countries receiving a Democracy Score of 4.00–4.99 are typically electoral democracies that meet only minimum standards for the selection of national leaders. Democratic institutions are fragile, and substantial challenges to the protection of political rights and civil liberties exist. The potential for sustainable, liberal democracy is unclear.

Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes: Countries receiving a Democracy Score of 5.00–5.99 attempt to mask authoritarianism or rely on informal power structures with limited respect for the institutions and practices of democracy. They typically fail to meet even the minimum standards of self-governing, electoral democracy.

Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes: Countries receiving a Democracy Score of 6.00–7.00 are closed societies in which dictators prevent political competition and pluralism and are responsible for widespread violations of basic political, civil, and human rights.


Nations in Transit does not rate governments per se, nor does it rate countries based on governmental intentions or legislation alone. Rather, a country's ratings are determined by considering the practical effect of the state and nongovernmental actors on an individual's rights and freedoms.

The *Nations in Transit* ratings, which should not be taken as absolute indicators of the situation in a given country, are valuable for making general assessments of how democratic or authoritarian a country is. They also allow for comparative analysis of reforms among the countries examined and for analysis of long-term developments in a particular country. The ratings for all categories reflect the consensus of Freedom House, the *Nations in Transit* advisers, and the report authors.

A more detailed description of the methodology, including complete checklist questions for each democracy indicator, can be found at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit-2015/methodology>.

PROPORTIONAL MAP OF NIT 2015 DEMOCRACY SCORES

With size shown in proportion to democratic progress




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REGIME BREAKDOWN BY POPULATION AND REGION, NIT 2005 VS. NIT 2015


Over the last decade, governments across the former Soviet space have used corrupt judicial and law enforcement bodies to incapacitate civic activists and eradicate the independent media, moving more and more countries into the category of Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes. In NIT 2015, seven countries, with a combined population of 222.9 million, lived under entrenched authoritarian leadership.

NIT 2005




NIT 2005

Eurasia




REGIONAL BREAKDOWN: REGIME TYPE AND POPULATION


NIT 2005



BALKANS
23,000,000




CENTRAL EUROPE
102,400,000




EURASIA
280,300,000


Central Europe



Balkans



NIT 2015




POPULATION BY REGIME TYPE

- Consolidated Democracy (CD)
- Semi-Consolidated Democracy (SCD)
- Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime (T/H)
- Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime (SCA)
- Consolidated Authoritarian Regime (CA)


NIT 2015

Eurasia




REGIONAL BREAKDOWN: REGIME TYPE AND POPULATION

NIT 2015




BALKANS
22,702,000





CENTRAL EUROPE
99,834,000

Central Europe



Balkans



EURASIA
284,994,000

NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2015



SURVEY FINDINGS


Regime Type	No. of countries
Consolidated Democracy (CD)	7
Semi-Consolidated Democracy (SCD)	6
Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime (T/H)	6
Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime (SCA)	3
Consolidated Authoritarian Regime (CA)	7
Total	29



The map reflects the findings of Freedom House’s *Nations in Transit 2015* survey, which assesses the status of democratic development in 29 countries from Central Europe to Central Asia during 2014. Freedom House introduced a Democracy Score—an average of each country’s ratings on all of the indicators covered by *Nations in Transit*—beginning with the 2004 edition. The Democracy Score is designed to simplify analysis of the countries’ overall progress or deterioration from year to year. Based on the Democracy Score and its scale of 1 to 7, Freedom House has defined the following regime types: **consolidated democracy (1–2)**, **semi-consolidated democracy (3)**, **transitional government/hybrid regime (4)**, **semi-consolidated authoritarian regime (5)**, and **consolidated authoritarian regime (6–7)**.

NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2015: OVERALL DEMOCRACY SCORES

NOTE: The NIT ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The NIT 2015 ratings reflect the period from 1 January through 31 December 2014.



NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2015: RATINGS AND DEMOCRACY SCORE SUMMARY

Countries are rated on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic progress. The average of these ratings is each country's Democracy Score (**DS**).

Categories

EP - Electoral Process
CS - Civil Society
IM - Independent Media

NDG - National Democratic Governance
LDG - Local Democratic Governance
JFI - Judicial Framework and Independence
CO - Corruption

Country	CATEGORIES							DS
	EP	CS	IM	NGOV	LGOV	JFI	CO	
Albania	4.00	3.00	4.00	4.50	3.50	4.75	5.25	4.14
Armenia	5.75	3.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.25	5.36
Azerbaijan	7.00	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75
Belarus	7.00	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	7.00	6.25	6.71
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3.25	3.50	4.75	5.75	4.75	4.50	4.75	4.46
Bulgaria	2.25	2.25	4.00	3.75	3.00	3.50	4.25	3.29
Croatia	3.25	2.75	4.00	3.50	3.75	4.50	4.00	3.68
Czech Republic	1.25	1.75	2.75	2.75	1.75	1.75	3.50	2.21
Estonia	1.75	1.75	1.50	2.25	2.50	1.50	2.50	1.96
Georgia	4.50	3.75	4.00	5.50	5.25	5.00	4.50	4.64
Hungary	2.75	2.50	3.75	3.75	3.00	2.75	3.75	3.18
Kazakhstan	6.75	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.61
Kosovo	4.75	3.75	5.50	5.50	4.75	5.75	6.00	5.14
Kyrgyzstan	5.50	4.75	6.00	6.50	6.25	6.25	6.25	5.93
Latvia	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.25	1.75	3.00	2.07
Lithuania	2.00	1.75	2.25	2.75	2.50	1.75	3.50	2.36
Macedonia	3.50	3.50	5.00	4.25	3.75	4.25	4.25	4.07
Moldova	4.00	3.25	5.00	5.50	5.75	4.75	5.75	4.86
Montenegro	3.50	2.75	4.50	4.25	3.25	4.00	5.00	3.89
Poland	1.50	1.50	2.50	2.50	1.50	2.50	3.50	2.21
Romania	3.25	2.50	4.25	3.75	3.00	3.75	3.75	3.46
Russia	6.75	6.00	6.50	6.75	6.25	6.25	6.75	6.46
Serbia	3.25	2.25	4.25	3.75	3.50	4.50	4.25	3.68
Slovakia	1.50	1.75	3.00	3.00	2.50	3.00	3.75	2.64
Slovenia	1.50	2.00	2.25	2.00	1.50	1.75	2.50	1.93
Tajikistan	6.75	6.50	6.25	6.50	6.00	6.50	6.25	6.39
Turkmenistan	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	6.75	7.00	6.75	6.93
Ukraine	3.50	2.25	4.00	6.00	5.50	6.00	6.00	4.75
Uzbekistan	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	6.75	7.00	6.75	6.93
Average	4.02	3.62	4.55	4.72	4.30	4.51	4.87	4.37
Median	3.50	3.00	4.25	4.50	3.75	4.50	4.75	4.14

**NIT RATINGS HISTORY AND REGIONAL BREAKDOWN:
ELECTORAL PROCESS**

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Central Europe										
Bulgaria	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.25	2.25
Czech Republic	2.00	1.75	1.75	1.50	1.50	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25
Estonia	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Hungary	1.25	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.75 ▼
Latvia	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Lithuania	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.00
Poland	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.75	1.50	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.50 ▼
Romania	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.50	2.75	2.75	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.25 ▼
Slovakia	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.75	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
Slovenia	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
Average	1.73	1.83	1.83	1.78	1.83	1.73	1.80	1.83	1.85	1.95
Median	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75

The Balkans										
Albania	3.50	4.00	4.00	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.00	4.00
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25
Croatia	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25
Kosovo	4.75	4.75	4.50	4.50	4.25	4.50	5.00	5.00	4.75	4.75
Macedonia	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50 ▼
Montenegro	3.50	3.50	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.50
Serbia	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25
Average	3.50	3.57	3.50	3.50	3.46	3.54	3.64	3.64	3.61	3.64
Median	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50

Eurasian States										
Armenia	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75
Azerbaijan	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Belarus	7.00	7.00	7.00	6.75	6.75	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Georgia	4.75	4.50	4.75	5.25	5.25	5.00	5.00	4.75	4.50	4.50
Kazakhstan	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Kyrgyzstan	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.00	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50
Moldova	3.75	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.25	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Russia	6.25	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Tajikistan	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75
Turkmenistan	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Ukraine	3.25	3.00	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.75	4.00	4.00	3.50 ▲
Uzbekistan	6.75	6.75	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Average	5.79	5.79	5.88	6.00	6.04	6.02	6.00	6.00	6.00	5.96
Median	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.63	6.63	6.63	6.63	6.63	6.75	6.75

**NIT RATINGS HISTORY AND REGIONAL BREAKDOWN:
CIVIL SOCIETY**

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Central Europe										
Bulgaria	2.75	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.25	2.25
Czech Republic	1.50	1.50	1.25	1.50	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Estonia	2.00	2.00	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Hungary	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.25	2.25	2.50 ▼
Latvia	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Lithuania	1.50	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Poland	1.25	1.50	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
Romania	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
Slovakia	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Slovenia	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Average	1.73	1.83	1.75	1.88	1.90	1.93	1.93	1.95	1.93	1.95
Median	1.63	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75

The Balkans

Albania	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3.75	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Croatia	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.75	2.75
Kosovo	4.25	4.25	4.00	4.00	3.75	3.75	3.75	4.00	3.75	3.75
Macedonia	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50 ▼
Montenegro	3.00	3.00	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75
Serbia	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.50	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25
Average	3.25	3.21	3.14	3.14	3.07	3.00	3.00	3.04	3.04	3.07
Median	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00

Eurasian States

Armenia	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75
Azerbaijan	5.00	5.25	5.25	5.50	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.75 ▼
Belarus	6.75	6.50	6.50	6.25	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50
Georgia	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75
Kazakhstan	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.50	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.50
Kyrgyzstan	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.75	5.00	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.50	4.75 ▼
Moldova	4.00	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.50	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25
Russia	5.00	5.25	5.50	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.25	5.50	5.75	6.00 ▼
Tajikistan	5.00	5.00	5.50	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.50 ▼
Turkmenistan	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Ukraine	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.50	2.25 ▲
Uzbekistan	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Average	4.98	4.98	5.02	5.13	5.17	5.10	5.15	5.25	5.27	5.33
Median	5.00	5.13	5.38	5.50	5.75	5.63	5.63	5.88	6.00	6.25

**NIT RATINGS HISTORY AND REGIONAL BREAKDOWN:
INDEPENDENT MEDIA**

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Central Europe										
Bulgaria	3.25	3.50	3.50	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00
Czech Republic	2.00	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.75	2.75
Estonia	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
Hungary	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.75	3.25	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.75 ▼
Latvia	1.50	1.50	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.00
Lithuania	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.00	2.25	2.25
Poland	1.75	2.25	2.25	2.00	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50
Romania	4.00	3.75	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25
Slovakia	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.75	3.00	3.00	2.75	2.75	2.75	3.00 ▼
Slovenia	1.75	2.00	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25
Average	2.23	2.33	2.40	2.43	2.55	2.60	2.63	2.70	2.78	2.83
Median	1.88	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.38	2.38	2.38	2.50	2.63	2.63

The Balkans

Albania	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.50	4.50	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75
Croatia	3.75	4.00	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Kosovo	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.50 ▲
Macedonia	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.75	4.75	5.00	5.00
Montenegro	3.25	3.50	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.50 ▼
Serbia	3.25	3.50	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.25 ▼
Average	3.96	4.07	4.14	4.21	4.32	4.46	4.50	4.50	4.54	4.57
Median	3.75	4.00	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.50

Eurasian States

Armenia	5.50	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	5.75	5.75	5.75
Azerbaijan	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Belarus	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Georgia	4.25	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.00	4.00
Kazakhstan	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Kyrgyzstan	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.25	6.25	6.00	6.00
Moldova	5.00	5.25	5.50	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Russia	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.50 ▼
Tajikistan	6.25	6.25	6.00	6.00	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25
Turkmenistan	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Ukraine	3.75	3.75	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.00 ▲
Uzbekistan	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Average	5.83	5.90	5.92	6.00	6.00	6.02	6.00	6.00	5.98	5.98
Median	6.00	6.25	6.13	6.25	6.38	6.38	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.38

**NIT RATINGS HISTORY AND REGIONAL BREAKDOWN:
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE**

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Central Europe										
Bulgaria	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.75	3.75
Czech Republic	2.50	3.00	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	3.00	2.75 ▲
Estonia	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25
Hungary	2.00	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.50	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.75	3.75
Latvia	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.50	2.50	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.00	2.00
Lithuania	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75
Poland	2.75	3.25	3.50	3.25	3.25	2.75	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
Romania	3.50	3.50	3.75	3.75	4.00	3.75	3.75	4.00	3.75	3.75
Slovakia	2.00	2.25	2.50	2.75	3.00	2.75	2.75	2.75	3.00	3.00
Slovenia	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Average	2.45	2.60	2.65	2.78	2.83	2.78	2.80	2.83	2.88	2.85
Median	2.38	2.38	2.50	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.88	2.75

The Balkans

Albania	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.75	4.75	5.00	4.75	4.50 ▲
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4.75	4.75	5.00	5.00	5.25	5.25	5.50	5.50	5.75	5.75
Croatia	3.50	3.50	3.25	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Kosovo	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.25	5.50	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.50
Macedonia	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25
Montenegro	4.50	4.50	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25
Serbia	4.00	3.75	4.00	4.00	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75
Average	4.32	4.32	4.32	4.32	4.39	4.46	4.54	4.57	4.54	4.50
Median	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25

Eurasian States

Armenia	5.00	5.25	5.25	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75
Azerbaijan	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Belarus	7.00	7.00	7.00	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Georgia	5.50	5.50	5.75	6.00	6.00	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.50	5.50
Kazakhstan	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Kyrgyzstan	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.75	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50
Moldova	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	6.00	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.50	5.50
Russia	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75 ▼
Tajikistan	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.50
Turkmenistan	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Ukraine	4.50	4.75	4.75	5.00	5.00	5.50	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.00
Uzbekistan	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Average	6.06	6.10	6.17	6.29	6.35	6.33	6.38	6.33	6.38	6.40
Median	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.38	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.63

**NIT RATINGS HISTORY AND REGIONAL BREAKDOWN:
LOCAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE**

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Central Europe										
Bulgaria	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Czech Republic	2.00	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Estonia	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
Hungary	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.75	2.75	3.00 ▼
Latvia	2.50	2.50	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25
Lithuania	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
Poland	2.00	2.25	2.25	2.00	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.50	1.50
Romania	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Slovakia	2.00	2.00	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
Slovenia	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
Average	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.35	2.33	2.33	2.33	2.35	2.33	2.35
Median	2.38	2.38	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50

The Balkans										
Albania	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	3.00	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.50	3.50
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75
Croatia	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75
Kosovo	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.25	5.00	5.00	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75
Macedonia	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75
Montenegro	3.50	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25
Serbia	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Average	3.96	3.93	3.93	3.89	3.86	3.89	3.86	3.89	3.89	3.89
Median	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75

Eurasian States										
Armenia	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75
Azerbaijan	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50
Belarus	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Georgia	5.75	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.25 ▲
Kazakhstan	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50
Kyrgyzstan	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.25	6.25	6.25
Moldova	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75
Russia	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.25 ▼
Tajikistan	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00
Turkmenistan	7.00	7.00	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Ukraine	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50
Uzbekistan	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Average	6.04	6.02	6.06	6.08	6.08	6.17	6.19	6.17	6.17	6.17
Median	5.88	5.88	6.00	6.13	6.13	6.13	6.25	6.13	6.13	6.25

**NIT RATINGS HISTORY AND REGIONAL BREAKDOWN:
JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK AND INDEPENDENCE**

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Central Europe										
Bulgaria	3.00	2.75	2.75	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50 ▼
Czech Republic	2.25	2.00	2.00	2.25	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.75	1.75	1.75
Estonia	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50
Hungary	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.25	2.75	2.50	2.50	2.75 ▼
Latvia	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Lithuania	1.50	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Poland	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50
Romania	4.00	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75
Slovakia	2.00	2.25	2.50	2.75	3.00	2.75	2.75	3.00	3.00	3.00
Slovenia	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Average	2.15	2.13	2.20	2.28	2.33	2.33	2.38	2.35	2.35	2.40
Median	1.88	1.88	1.88	2.00	2.00	2.13	2.25	2.13	2.13	2.13

The Balkans

Albania	4.25	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.50 ▼
Croatia	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.50
Kosovo	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.75 ▼
Macedonia	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25
Montenegro	4.25	4.25	4.00	4.25	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Serbia	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50
Average	4.36	4.32	4.36	4.43	4.39	4.43	4.46	4.50	4.54	4.61
Median	4.25	4.25	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.50

Eurasian States

Armenia	5.00	5.00	5.25	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50
Azerbaijan	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75 ▼
Belarus	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Georgia	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	4.75	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Kazakhstan	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50
Kyrgyzstan	5.50	5.50	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25
Moldova	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.75	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.75	4.75
Russia	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.50	5.50	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.25 ▼
Tajikistan	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.50 ▼
Turkmenistan	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Ukraine	4.25	4.50	4.75	5.00	5.00	5.50	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00
Uzbekistan	6.75	6.75	6.75	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Average	5.63	5.65	5.75	5.83	5.92	6.00	6.13	6.13	6.15	6.21
Median	5.63	5.63	5.88	5.88	6.13	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.38

**NIT RATINGS HISTORY AND REGIONAL BREAKDOWN:
CORRUPTION**

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Central Europe										
Bulgaria	3.75	3.75	3.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25
Czech Republic	3.50	3.50	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.50
Estonia	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50
Hungary	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.75	3.75
Latvia	3.25	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.25	3.00	3.00	3.00
Lithuania	4.00	4.00	3.75	3.75	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Poland	3.25	3.00	3.00	2.75	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.50
Romania	4.25	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.75 ▲
Slovakia	3.00	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.75	3.50	3.50	3.75	3.75	3.75
Slovenia	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.50
Average	3.28	3.23	3.15	3.25	3.35	3.33	3.28	3.30	3.43	3.40
Median	3.25	3.13	3.13	3.25	3.38	3.50	3.38	3.38	3.50	3.50

The Balkans										
Albania	5.25	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.25	5.25	5.25
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.75	4.75	4.75
Croatia	4.75	4.75	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.25	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00
Kosovo	6.00	6.00	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.00
Macedonia	4.75	4.75	4.50	4.25	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25
Montenegro	5.25	5.50	5.25	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Serbia	4.75	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25
Average	5.00	4.96	4.82	4.79	4.75	4.68	4.64	4.75	4.79	4.79
Median	4.75	4.75	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.75	4.75	4.75

Eurasian States										
Armenia	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.25
Azerbaijan	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75
Belarus	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25
Georgia	5.50	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.75	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.50
Kazakhstan	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50
Kyrgyzstan	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25
Moldova	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	5.75	5.75	5.75
Russia	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75
Tajikistan	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25
Turkmenistan	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Ukraine	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.00 ▲
Uzbekistan	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Average	6.13	6.08	6.10	6.10	6.17	6.13	6.13	6.13	6.17	6.15
Median	6.13	6.13	6.25	6.25	6.38	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25

**NIT RATINGS HISTORY AND REGIONAL BREAKDOWN:
DEMOCRACY SCORES**

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Central Europe										
Bulgaria	2.93	2.89	2.86	3.04	3.04	3.07	3.14	3.18	3.25	3.29 ▼
Czech Republic	2.25	2.25	2.14	2.18	2.21	2.18	2.18	2.14	2.25	2.21 ▲
Estonia	1.96	1.96	1.93	1.93	1.96	1.93	1.93	1.96	1.96	1.96
Hungary	2.00	2.14	2.14	2.29	2.39	2.61	2.86	2.89	2.96	3.18 ▼
Latvia	2.07	2.07	2.07	2.18	2.18	2.14	2.11	2.07	2.07	2.07
Lithuania	2.21	2.29	2.25	2.29	2.25	2.25	2.29	2.32	2.36	2.36
Poland	2.14	2.36	2.39	2.25	2.32	2.21	2.14	2.18	2.18	2.21 ▼
Romania	3.39	3.29	3.36	3.36	3.46	3.43	3.43	3.50	3.46	3.46
Slovakia	1.96	2.14	2.29	2.46	2.68	2.54	2.50	2.57	2.61	2.64 ▼
Slovenia	1.75	1.82	1.86	1.93	1.93	1.93	1.89	1.89	1.93	1.93
Average	2.27	2.32	2.33	2.39	2.44	2.43	2.45	2.47	2.50	2.53
Median	2.11	2.20	2.20	2.27	2.29	2.23	2.24	2.25	2.31	2.29


The Balkans

Albania	3.79	3.82	3.82	3.82	3.93	4.04	4.14	4.25	4.18	4.14 ▲
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4.07	4.04	4.11	4.18	4.25	4.32	4.36	4.39	4.43	4.46 ▼
Croatia	3.71	3.75	3.64	3.71	3.71	3.64	3.61	3.61	3.68	3.68
Kosovo	5.36	5.36	5.21	5.14	5.07	5.18	5.18	5.25	5.14	5.14
Macedonia	3.82	3.82	3.86	3.86	3.79	3.82	3.89	3.93	4.00	4.07 ▼
Montenegro	3.89	3.93	3.79	3.79	3.79	3.82	3.82	3.82	3.86	3.89 ▼
Serbia	3.71	3.68	3.79	3.79	3.71	3.64	3.64	3.64	3.64	3.68 ▼
Average	4.05	4.06	4.03	4.04	4.04	4.07	4.09	4.13	4.13	4.15
Median	3.82	3.82	3.82	3.82	3.79	3.82	3.89	3.93	4.00	4.07


Eurasian States

Armenia	5.14	5.21	5.21	5.39	5.39	5.43	5.39	5.36	5.36	5.36
Azerbaijan	5.93	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.39	6.46	6.57	6.64	6.68	6.75 ▼
Belarus	6.71	6.68	6.71	6.57	6.50	6.57	6.68	6.71	6.71	6.71
Georgia	4.86	4.68	4.79	4.93	4.93	4.86	4.82	4.75	4.68	4.64 ▲
Kazakhstan	6.39	6.39	6.39	6.32	6.43	6.43	6.54	6.57	6.61	6.61
Kyrgyzstan	5.68	5.68	5.93	6.04	6.21	6.11	6.00	5.96	5.89	5.93 ▼
Moldova	4.96	4.96	5.00	5.07	5.14	4.96	4.89	4.82	4.86	4.86
Russia	5.75	5.86	5.96	6.11	6.14	6.18	6.18	6.21	6.29	6.46 ▼
Tajikistan	5.93	5.96	6.07	6.14	6.14	6.14	6.18	6.25	6.32	6.39 ▼
Turkmenistan	6.96	6.96	6.93	6.93	6.93	6.93	6.93	6.93	6.93	6.93
Ukraine	4.21	4.25	4.25	4.39	4.39	4.61	4.82	4.86	4.93	4.75 ▲
Uzbekistan	6.82	6.82	6.86	6.89	6.93	6.93	6.93	6.93	6.93	6.93
Average	5.78	5.79	5.84	5.92	5.96	5.97	5.99	6.00	6.02	6.03
Median	5.84	5.91	5.98	6.13	6.18	6.16	6.18	6.23	6.31	6.43


Albania
4.14




Armenia
5.36



Azerbaijan
6.75




Belarus
6.71




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
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Bosnia-Herzegovina
4.46




Bulgaria
3.29




EP - Electoral Process
CS - Civil Society
IM - Independent Media
NDG - National Democratic Governance
LDG - Local Democratic Governance
JFI - Judicial Framework and Independence
CO - Corruption


Croatia
3.68




Czech Republic
2.21







Estonia
1.96











Georgia
4.64






NIT 2015 COUNTRY RATINGS


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
Romania
3.46




Russia
6.46



Serbia
3.68




Slovakia
2.64





NIT 2015 COUNTRY RATINGS


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Slovenia
1.93




Tajikistan
6.39




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
Turkmenistan
6.93



Ukraine
4.75



Uzbekistan
6.93





Freedom House is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that supports democratic change, monitors freedom, and advocates for democracy and human rights.

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