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SHADOW ECONOMIES AROUND THE WORLD WITH LATEST RESULTS (2019) FOR ROMANIA AND HER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES: WHAT DID WE LEARN OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS?



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1. INTRODUCTION

- (1) There are many political statements that tax evasion and the shadow economy are important and cause severe damage on the official economy and on public (tax) revenues.
- (2) Hence, the goal of this lecture is *threefold*:
 - To present the size and development of the shadow economy and of tax evasion in 158 countries all over the world and of 5 European countries: Romania and her 5 neighboring countries.
 - (ii) To critically discuss the plausibility of the MIMIC-Macro-Estimates of the shadow economy of 158 worldwide countries and to compare them with results from other methods.
 - (iii) Finally, policy measures to reduce the shadow economy are presented.



1. INTRODUCTION

- A shadow economy has many names, like cash, underground, grey or sometimes dark economy. There is no convention what the "correct" name is.
- A shadow economy is more or less a parallel economy meaning, that additional "shadow activities" are captured like: neighbors or friends help, do-it-yourself activities or family production in general (and in the agricultural sector).
- Hence, the consequence is, that using macromethodes quite often a *"large" shadow economy* is measured.



2.1 DEFINITIONS

- (1) The shadow economy includes all legal production and provision of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following four reasons:
 - (i) to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes;
 - (ii) to avoid payment of social security contributions;
 - (iii) to avoid having to meet certain legal standards such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, etc.; and
 - (iv) to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures.

2.1 DEFINITIONS

- (2) Underground activities are all illegal actions that fit the characteristics of classical crime activities like *smuggling*, burglary, drug dealing, etc.
- (3) Informal household and do-it-yourself activities are household actions that are not registered officially under various specific forms of national legislation.

These two activities should not be included in the shadow economy activities, but to some extent they are.

(4) *Tax evasion* is under- (or not) reporting capital and/or labor income, domestic or abroad.

2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 2.2 THEORIZING ABOUT THE SHADOW ECONOMY AND TAX EVASION

What are the main causes determining the size of the shadow economy and of tax evasion? In () the expected sign.

- (i) Tax and social security contribution burdens; (+)
- (ii) Intensity of regulations (+); (iii) Public Sector Services (-);
- (iv) Tax morale (-); (v) Unemployment (+);
- (vi) Self-employment (+); (vii) Size of the agricultural sector (+);
- (viii) Official income (-); (ix) Quality of public institutions (-);
- (x) Federal (direct democratic) system (-)

What are the main indicators, in which shadow economy activities are reflected?

(i) Official GDP (+/-); (ii) Cash (+); (iii) Official Employment (-)

2.3 PROBLEM OF DOUBLE COUNTING

All ten cause factors, but especially

- (i) tax burden, (ii) regulation,
- (iii) unemployment, (iv) self-employment,
- (v) and size of the agricultural sector are also major driving forces for smuggling, do-it-yourself activities and neighbors help.

Hence, in the MIMIC and Currency Demand Estimations these activities are (at least) partly included; hence, these estimates are higher than the "true" shadow economy estimates.



THREE ESTIMATION PROCEDURES

- (1) Direct procedures that use the micro, individual level and then estimate the size of the shadow economy. Quite often this method is done by surveys and by "calculating" discrepancies in National Accounts.
- (2) Indirect procedures that make use of macroeconomic indicators proxying the development of the shadow economy over time; e.g. the currency demand approach.
- (3) Statistical models that use statistical tools to estimate the shadow economy as an "unobserved" or "latent" variable; e.g. the MIMIC (Multiple Indicator, Multiple Causes) Method.

3.1 DIRECT APPROACHES – GENERAL REMARKS

- (1) These are microeconomic approaches that employ either well designed surveys or samples based on voluntary replies or tax auditing and other compliance methods.
- (2) Estimates of the shadow economy can also be based on the discrepancy between income declared for tax purposes and the actual detected one by audits.

Advantage of methods (1) and (2): Detailed knowledge about the shadow economy on an individual basis.



3.2 THE CURRENCY DEMAND APPROACH

Basic regression equation for the currency demand from Tanzi (1983):

$$ln (C / M2)_{t} = b_{0} + b_{1} ln (1 + TW)_{t} + b_{2} ln (WS / Y)_{t} + b_{3} ln R_{t} + b_{4} ln (Y / N)_{t} + u_{t}$$

with $b_1 > 0$, $b_2 > 0$, $b_3 < 0$, $b_4 > 0$, where

In denotes natural logarithms,

- **C / M2** ratio of cash holdings to deposit accounts,
- **TW** average tax rate (to proxy changes of the shadow economy),
- WS / Y percentage of wages and salaries in national income (to capture changing payment and money holding patterns),
- R interest on savings deposits (to capture the opportunity cost of cash), and
- Y/N per capita income.



3.2 THE CURRENCY DEMAND APPROACH - OBJECTIONS

- (1) Not all transactions in the shadow economy are paid in cash.
- (2) Blades and Feige, criticize that the US dollar is used as an international currency.
- (3) The often criticized assumption of the same velocity of money in both types of economies.
- (4) Ahumada, Canavese and Canavese criticize that the assumption of equal income velocity of money in both economies is only correct, if the income elasticity is 1.
- (5) Finally, the assumption of 0 or x-percent shadow economy in a base year is open to criticism.

3.3 The Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) Approach:

- Modeling the shadow economy as an unobservable (latent) variable;
- > Description of the relationships between the latent variable and its causes in a structural model: $\eta = \Gamma x + \zeta$
- > Link between the latent variable and its indicators is represented in the measurement model: $y = \Lambda_v \eta + \varepsilon$
- **η:** latent variable (shadow economy)
- X: (q×1) vector of causes in the structural model
- Y: (p×1) vector of indicators in the measurement model
- **Γ**: (1×q) coefficient matrix of the causes in the structural equation
- Λ_v : (p×1) coefficient matrix in the measurement model
- ζ, ϵ : error term in the structural model and ϵ is a (p×1) vector of measurement error in y



Figure 3.1: Path diagram of the MIMIC model¹⁾







3. ESTIMATION OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY

Table 3.2: MIMIC Model Estimation Results: 1991-2015, 158 Countries (Part 1)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Causes | | | | | | |
| Trade Openness | -0.086*** | -0.085*** | -0.137*** | -0.086*** | -0.086*** | -0.113*** |
| GDP per Capita | -0.332*** | -0.335*** | -0.37*** | -0.298*** | -0.302*** | -0.334*** |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.051** | 0.054*** | 0.069*** | 0.053** | 0.057*** | 0.069*** |
| Size of Government | 0.102*** | 0.102*** | 0.111*** | | | |
| Fiscal Freedom | | | | -0.131*** | -0.134*** | -0.147*** |
| Rule of Law | -0.049*** | | | -0.06*** | | |
| Control for Corruption | | -0.042*** | | | -0.046** | |
| Government Stability | | | -0.054*** | | | -0.015 |

Source: Own calculations. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



3. ESTIMATION OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY

Table 3.2: MIMIC Model Estimation Results: 1991-2015, 158 Countries (Part 2)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Indicators | | | | | | |
| Currency | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Labor Force Participation Rate | -0.521*** | -0.532*** | -0.31*** | -0.452*** | -0.468*** | -0.249*** |
| Growth of GDP p.c. | -0.208** | -0.245*** | -0.386*** | -0.113 | -0.144* | -0.157*** |
| Statistical Tests | | | | | | |
| RMSEA | 0.073 | 0.073 | 0.067 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.055 |
| Chi-square | 5.13 | 5.06 | 6.49 | 5.08 | 5.06 | 5.35 |
| Observations | 1897 | 1892 | 2350 | 1758 | 1757 | 1998 |
| Countries | 151 | 151 | 122 | 144 | 144 | 120 |

Source: Own calculations. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3. ESTIMATION OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY

Figure 3.2: Shadow economy by region (average, percent of GDP)





Figure 3.3: Size of the shadow economy in % of GDP of the 15 countries with the highest and the lowest shadow economy – Part I (highest); average over 1991 to 2015.





Figure 3.3: Size of the shadow economy in % of GDP of the 15 countries with the highest and the lowest shadow economy – Part II (lowest); average over 1991 to 2015.





 Table 3.3: Decomposition of the shadow economy activities in Estonia and Germany

| Kinds of shadow economy activities (rough | Est | onia | Germany | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| estimates!) | Size in % of official GDP average 2009-2015 | Proportion of total shadow economy | Size in % of official GDP average 2009-2015 | Proportion of total shadow economy | |
| (1) Total (macro) shadow economy (estimated by the MIMIC and calibrated by the currency demand procedures) | 28.0 | 100% | 16.2 | 100% | |
| (2) Legally bought material for shadow economy and DIY-activities | 6.0 | 21% | 3.1 | 19.1% | |
| (3) Illegal activities (smuggling etc.) | 2.0 | 7% | 1.2 | 7.4% | |
| (4) Do-it-yourself activities and neighbors help ¹⁾ | 2.0 | 7% | 1.5 | 9.2% | |
| (5) Sum (2) and (4) | 10.0 | 35% | 5.8 | 35.7% | |
| (6) "Corrected" or "adjusted" shadow economy, but legal activities (position (1) minus position (5)) | 18.0 | 65% | 10.4 | 64.2% | |
| ¹⁾ Without legally bought material which is included | in (2) | | | | |

Source: Own calculations, Linz, September 2016.



Table 3.4: Size of the shadow economies of different country groups Macro-MIMIC + adj. MIMICin []

| | Size of the shadow economy ¹⁾ | | | | |
|------------------------------|--|---------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Country groups | No. of | Years | Years | Years | Average |
| Country groups | NO. OI | 1991- | 2000- | 2010- | over 1999 |
| | countries | 1999 | 2009 | 2015 | - 2015 |
| Fact Acia | 10 | 25.53 | 23.86 | 21.08 | 23.49 |
| | 19 | [16.59] | [15.51] | [13.70] | [15.27] |
| Middle East and North Africa | 10 | 27.31 | 24.34 | 23.81 | 25.15 |
| WINDOLE EAST AND NORTH AIRCA | 10 | [17.75] | [15.82] | [15.48] | [16.35] |
| Furana | 27 | 28.12 | 24.79 | 22.77 | 25.23 |
| Europe | 37 | [18.28] | [16.11] | [14.80] | [16.40] |
| South Asia | 7 | 34.75 | 32.31 | 27.58 | 31.55 |
| South Asia | | [22.59] | [21,00] | [17.93] | [20.51] |
| Sub Sabaran Africa | 40 | 42.36 | 39.98 | 36.13 | 39,49 |
| Sub-Sanaran Airica | 42 | [27.53] | [25.99] | [23.48] | [25.67] |
| Latin Amarica Caribaan | 24 | 42.29 | 39.33 | 34.80 | 38.81 |
| | 24 | [27.49] | [25.56] | [22.62] | [25.22] |
| | 24 | 21.42 | 18.84 | 18.24 | 19.5 |
| | 54 | [13.92] | [12.25] | [11.86] | [12.68] |
| Average ever all countries | 101 | 31.68 | 29.06 | 26.34 | 29.03 |
| Average over all countries | 181 | [20.59] | [18.89] | [17.12] | [18.87] |

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1) Unweighted averages Source: Own calculations. September 2019 © Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, Austria 21 of 38

3.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Figure 3.4: Size of the Shadow Economy of 16 European Countries in 2017– macro and adjusted



Figure 3.4: A comparison of the size of the shadow economy (in % of GDP) of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Moldavia and Ukraine. Average over 2008 to 2018:



Figure 3.5: The development of the shadow economy (in % of GDP) of Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary over 2016 to 2018 applying macro-mimic and adjusted mimic method.



Figure 3.6: The development of the shadow economy (in % of GDP) of Romania and Bulgaria from 2009 to 2019.



4.1 Surveys

- (1) Quite often only households are considered;
- (2) Non-responses and/or incorrect responses;
- (3) Results of the financial volume of "black" hours worked and <u>not</u> of value added.
- (4) New methods are promising

4.2 Discrepancy Method

- (1) Combination of meso estimates/assumptions;
- (2) Calculation method often not clear;
- (3) Documentation and procedures often not public.



4.3 Monetary and/or Electricity Methods

- (1) Some estimates are very high, only macro-estimates and a double counting problem.
- (2) Are the assumptions about the size of the shadow economy and it's activities plausible?
- (3) Breakdown by sector or industry not possible!
- (4) Great differences to convert millions of KWh into a value added figure when using the electricity method (Lackó approach).



4.4 MIMIC (Latent) Method:

- (1) Only relative coefficients, no absolute values.
- (2) Estimations quite often highly sensitive with respect to changes in the data and specifications.
- (3) Difficulty to differentiate between the selection of causes and indicators; little theoretical "guidance".
- (4) The use of the calibration procedure and starting values has great influence on the size and development of the shadow economy.
- (5) High macro values of the shadow economy and again a double counting problem



4.5 Open Research Questions and Recommendations

- (1) No ideal or dominating method all have serious problems and weaknesses.
- (2) If possible use several methods.
- (3) Much more research is needed with respect to the estimation methodology and empirical results for different countries and periods.
- (4) Experimental methods should be used to provide a microfoundation.
- (5) A satisfactory validation of the empirical results should be developed so that it is easier to judge the empirical results with respect to their plausibility.



4.5 Open Research Questions and Recommendations

- (6) An internationally accepted definition of the shadow economy is still missing. Such a definition is needed in order to make comparisons easier between countries and methods; also to avoid a double counting problem, e.g. legal bought material.
- (7) The link between theory and empirical estimation of the shadow economy is still unsatisfactory.

In the best case theory provides us with derived signs of the causal and indicator variables.

However, which are the "core" causal and which are the "core" indicator variables is theoretically "open".



5. POLICY MEASURES 5.1 GENERAL STATEMENT

In every country the government faces the challenge to undertake policy measures which reduce a shadow economy and tax evasion.

However, the crucial question is: "Is this a blessing or a curse?"

Answers:

(1) If one assumes, that roughly 50% of all shadow economy activities complement those of the official sector (i.e. those goods would not be produced in the official sector) the development of the total (official + shadow economy) GDP is always higher than the "pure" official one.



5. POLICY MEASURES 5.1 GENERAL STATEMENT (CONT.)

- (2) A decline of the shadow economy will only increase the total welfare in every country if the policy maker succeeds in transferring a shadow economic activity into the official economy.
- (3) Therefore, a policy maker has to favor and choose such policy measures that strongly increase the incentives to transfer the production from the shadow (black) to the official sector.

→ Only then the decline of the shadow economy will be a blessing for the whole economy.



5. POLICY MEASURES Table 5.1: Interactions between the shadow economy and the official economy

| The shadow | through | Effects on official economy and overall economic |
|--------------------|---|---|
| economy influences | | performance |
| | tax evasion | Redestribution policies to finance qualitative and quantitative improvement of public goods are impaired, thus economic growth may be negatively affected (Schneider (2005, 2015). |
| Tax system | additional tax revenues | If the shadow economic activity is complementary to the official economy, extra income is generated via the shadow economy which is then (at least partly) spent in the official economy for goods and services (Schneider (2005, 2015). |
| Allocations | stronger competition and stimulation of markets | more efficient use of scarce resources incentives for firms and individuals, stimulation of creativity and innovation enlargement of market supply through additional goods and services cost advantages of producers acting from the shadow economy may lead to ruinous competition problems in information flows for producers and consumers due to reduction in transparency and lack of |
| Policy decisions | bias in offi- cially pub- | stabilizing, redistributional and fiscal policies may fail desired effects* |
| | = negative infl | uence \longrightarrow = positive influence 33 of 38 |

5. POLICY MEASURES 5.2 POLICY MEASURES AGAINST THE SHADOW ECONOMY AND TAX EVASION

Seven policy measures:

- (1) Unemployment is either controllable by the government through economic policy in a traditional Keynesian sense; or the government can try to improve the country's competitiveness to increase foreign demand.
- (2) The impact of *self-employment* on the shadow economy is only partly controllable by the government. A government can deregulate the economy or incentivize *"to be your own entrepreneur"*, which would make self-employment easier, potentially reducing unemployment and positively contributing to efforts in controlling the size of the shadow economy.



5. POLICY MEASURES 5.2 POLICY MEASURES AGAINST THE SHADOW ECONOMY AND TAX EVASION (CONT.)

- (3) These two policies need to be *accompanied* with a *strengthening* of *institutions* and *trust* in *public institutions* to reduce the probability that self-employed shift reasonable proportions of their economic activities into the shadow economy, which, if it happened, made government policies incentivizing self-employment less effective.
- (4) Besides these measures, policy makers should focus to *reduce overall taxation* (especially indirect taxation and custom duties).



5. POLICY MEASURES 5.2 POLICY MEASURES AGAINST THE SHADOW ECONOMY AND TAX EVASION (CONT.)

- (5) Equally important is the quality of institutions; i.e. creating democratic and transparent institutions with lesser regulatory burden, corruption and bureaucracy in order to be able to restore the trust and confidence of the people in the public institutions.
- (6) Reducing administrative burden on businesses by simplifying the procedures for obtaining licenses, accelerating the release of documents required for entrepreneurship, reducing bureaucratic barriers for such documents and increasing transparency of the whole process.



5. POLICY MEASURES 5.2 POLICY MEASURES AGAINST THE SHADOW ECONOMY AND TAX EVASION (CONT.)

- (7) Discouraging the use of cash by increasing popularity of electronic payments. Key measures in this regard should focus on:
 - (i) development of adequate infrastructure for bank cards and other electronic payments, particularly in the service sector and in rural areas;
 - *(ii) creating incentives* for companies that encourage their customers to use electronic payments, and to pay the salaries of their employees into a bank account;
 - *(iii) organizing unscheduled inspections* in companies to verify that card terminals and other related infrastructure work correctly.



THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR ATTENTION!



6. APPENDIX: FURTHER EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Table A 0: Size of the shadow economy *in Germany in the year 2005* using two different estimation approaches

| Estimation approach | In % of off. GDP | In bill. euros | In % of the total shadow economy (Macro-MIMIC) |
|---|---------------------|-------------------|--|
| Survey about black labor as value-added provided by Feld and Larsen (2012a) | 3.6% | 70 | 22.5% |
| + correction of the survey, see Feld and Larsen (2012a, p. 61) | 5.1% | 112 | 32% |
| + material used | 3.0-4.0% | 65-90 | 19-25% |
| + illegal activities | 4.3-4.8% | 90-105 | 27-30% |
| + shadow economy activities already included in the GDP | 0.1-0.2% | 2-4 | 1% |
| Shadow economy using the MIMIC procedure (and for calibration the currency demand approach) | 15.5-16.0% | 340-350 | 100% |

 Table source: Enste and Schneider (2006), Table 2, p. 188.

Sources of representative survey: Feld and Larsen (2005, 2012a, 2012b) and Pedersen (2003).

The source of illegal activities and official material used are based on survey of TNS-Emnid (2004) ordered by the German research institute IW, Cologne.



Table A 1: A comparison of the size of the shadow economy (in % of GDP) in the Baltic countries 2009 –2015 by Putnins and Sauka with Zukauskas and Schneider, and Schneider (Macro and adjusted).

| | | Estor | nia | | Latvia | | | | Lithuar | nia | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------|---------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------|---------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------|---------------|-------|--|
| Year | Putnin s and Sauka | Zukaus- kas and Schnei- der | Schn | eider | Putnins and Sauka | Zukaus- kas and Schnei- der | Schn | eider | Putnins and Sauka | Zukaus- kas and Schnei- der | Schne | eider | | |
| | Firm | | MIN | ЛІС | Firm | | | | MIN | MIMIC | | | MIMIC | |
| | Manag- ers | Survey | Macro | Corr. Adj. | Manag- ers | Survey | Macro | Corr. Adj. | Manag- ers | Survey | Macro | Corr. Adj. | | |
| 2009 | 20.2% | | 29.6% | 19.4% | 36.6% | | 27.1% | 17.6% | 17.7% | | 29.6% | 19.2 % | | |
| 2010 | 19.4% | | 29.3% | 19.1% | 38.1% | | 27.3% | 17.7% | 18.8% | | 29.7% | 19.3 % | | |
| 2011 | 18.9% | | 28.6% | 18.6% | 30.2% | | 26.5% | 17.2% | 17.1% | | 29.0% | 18.9 % | | |
| 2012 | 19.2% | | 28.2% | 18.3% | 21.1% | | 26.1% | 17.0% | 18.2% | | 28.5% | 18.5 % | | |
| 2013 | 15.7% | | 27.6% | 17.9% | 23.8% | | 25.5% | 16.6% | 15.3% | | 28.0% | 18.2 % | | |
| 2014 | 13.2% | | 27.1% | 17.6% | 23.5% | | 24.7% | 16.0% | 12.5% | | 27.1% | 17.6 % | | |
| 2015 | 14.9% | 15.0 % | 26.2% | 17.0% | 21.3% | 11.7 % | 23.6% | 15.3% | 15.0% | 9.8 % | 25.8% | 16.8 % | | |
| Average 2009 - 2015 | 17.4% | | 28.1% | 18.3% | 27,8% | | 25,8% | 16.8% | 16.4% | | 28.2% | 18.4 % | | |

Source: Putnins and Sauka, 2016, Table 1, p.12 and Schneider, Zukauskas and Schneider, own calculations, Linz, September 2016.



6. APPENDIX A1: FURTHER RESULTS

Table A 4: The Size of the Shadow Economy in Germany According to Different Methods (in % of official GDP) – Part 1

| Mathad/Sauraa | Shadow economy (in % of official GDP) in: | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|--------------------------|-------------|------|------|------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| Method/Source | 1970 | 1975 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | |
| Survey (IfD Allensbach, | - | 3.6 ¹⁾ | - | - | - | - | - | - | |
| 1975) (Feld and Larsen, | - | - | - | - | - | - | 4.1 ²⁾ | 3.1 ²⁾ | |
| 2005) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.3 ³⁾ | 1.0 ³⁾ | |
| Disrepancy between expenditure and income (Lippert and Walker, 1997) | 11.0 | 10.2 | 13.4 | - | - | - | - | - | |
| Discrepancy between official and actual employment (Langfeldt, 1983) | 23.0 | 38.5 | 34.0 | - | - | - | - | - | |

1) 1974.

2) 2001 and 2004; calculated using wages in the official economy.

3) 2001 and 2004; calculated using actual "black" hourly wage paid.



6. APPENDIX A1: FURTHER RESULTS

Table A 4: The Size of the Shadow Economy in Germany According to Different Methods (in % of official GDP) – Part 2

| Mathad/Sauraa | Shadow economy (in % of official GDP) in: | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--|--|
| Method/Source | 1970 | 1975 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | | |
| Physical input method (Feld and Larsen, 2005) | - | - | 13.5 | 14.5 | 14.6 | - | - | - | | |
| Transactions approach | 17.2 | 22.3 | 29.3 | 31.4 | I | - | - | - | | |
| Currency demand approach (Kirchgässner | 3.1 | 6.0 | 10.3 | - | - | - | - | - | | |
| 1983; Langfeldt, 1982, | 12.1 | 11.8 | 12.6 | - | - | - | - | - | | |
| Enste, 2000) | 4.5 | 7.8 | 9.2 | 11.3 | 11.8 | 12.5 | 14.7 | - | | |
| Latent (MIMIC) approach | 5.8 | 6.1 | 8.2 | - | - | - | - | - | | |
| (Frey and Weck, 1983; Pickardt and Sarda, 2006; | - | - | 9.4 | 10.1 | 11.4 | 15.1 | 16.3 | - | | |
| Schneider 2005, 2007) | 4.2 | 5.8 | 10.8 | 11.2 | 12.2 | 13.9 | 16.0 | 15.4 | | |
| Soft modelling (Weck- Hannemann, 1983) | - | 8.3 | 8.3 | - | - | - | - | - | | |

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6. APPENDIX A2: ESTIMATION PROCEDURE OF TAX EVASION

Table A 5: The calculation of tax evasion

| Kinds of shadow economy activities | Size in % of of official GDP | Proportion of the overall shadow economy |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| (1) Total shadow economy (estimated by the MIMIC and calibrated by the currency demand procedures) | 15.0 | 100% |
| (2) Legally bought material | 3.0–4.0 | 20–26% |
| (3) Illegal activities (goods and services) | 1.0–2.0 | 7–13% |
| (4) Do-it yourself and neighbors help without material | 3.0-4.0 | 20-26% |
| (5) Already in the official GDP included illegal activities | 1.0–2.0 | 7–13% |
| (6) Sum (2) to (5) | 8.0–12.0 | 53–80% |
| (7) Explicit shadow economic, but legal activities (position (1) minus position (5)) | 3.0–7.0 | 20–47% |
| (8) Tax evasion (approx. 35% of the explicit shadow economy, driving forces: indirect taxation and self- employment) | 1.4–2.5 | 10–16% |

Source: Buehn and Schneider (2013), p. 12.



6. APPENDIX A 2: THE AMOUNT OF TAX EVASION IN 31 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Table A 7: Size of tax evasion in % of GDP of 31 highly developed European countries in 2017

| Country | Tax evasion | Tax Evasion Adj. |
|--------------|-------------|------------------|
| Bulgaria | 3.8 | 2.5 |
| Turkey | 3.5 | 2.3 |
| Croatia | 3.4 | 2.2 |
| Romania | 3.4 | 2.2 |
| Estonia | 3.2 | 2.1 |
| Lithuania | 3.1 | 2.0 |
| South-Cyprus | 3.1 | 2.0 |
| Malta | 3.1 | 2.0 |
| Slovenia | 2.9 | 1.9 |
| Hungary | 2.9 | 1.9 |
| Poland | 2.9 | 1.9 |
| Greece | 2.8 | 1.8 |
| Latvia | 2.8 | 1.8 |
| Italy | 2.6 | 1.7 |
| Spain | 2.2 | 1.5 |



6. APPENDIX A 3: THE AMOUNT OF TAX EVASION IN 31 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Table A 8: Size of tax evasion in % of GDP of 31 highly developed European countries in 2017 (cont.)

| Country | Tax evasion | Tax Evasion Adj. |
|----------------|-------------|------------------|
| Portugal | 2.2 | 1.4 |
| Belgium | 2.0 | 1.3 |
| Czech Republic | 1.8 | 1.2 |
| Slovakia | 1.7 | 1.1 |
| France | 1.7 | 1.1 |
| Norway | 1.6 | 1.0 |
| Sweden | 1.6 | 1.0 |
| Finland | 1.5 | 1.0 |
| Denmark | 1.4 | 0.9 |
| Germany | 1.4 | 0.9 |
| Ireland | 1.4 | 0.9 |
| United Kingdom | 1.2 | 0.8 |
| Netherlands | 1.1 | 0.7 |
| Luxembourg | 1.1 | 0.7 |
| Austria | 0.9 | 0.6 |
| Switzerland | 0.8 | 0.5 |

Source: Own calculations.

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